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BRIEF OF CORPORATE LAW PROFESSORS 
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT 
OF RESPONDENTS 
The undersigned corporate law professors re-
spectfully submit this brief as amici curiae in sup-
port of Respondents.1 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici have no personal stake in the outcome of 
this case; their interest is in assisting the parties 
and the Court in understanding corporate law and 
the rights of shareholders, insofar as that law and 
those rights are relevant to the questions presented 
in this case.  Joining in this brief as amici are the 
following nineteen law professors, whose research 
and teaching have focused on corporate law: 
John C. Coates IV, John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor 
of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, and 
Visiting Professor of Finance, Harvard Business 
School 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman and Al-
icia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Econom-
ics, and Finance, and Director of the Program on 
Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School  
                                            
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici state that no counsel for a 
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or 
party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the prep-
aration or submission of this brief.  No person other than amici 
curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the 
preparation or submission of the brief.  Pursuant to Rule 
37.3(a), all appropriate parties have filed letters granting blan-
ket consent to the filing of amici curiae briefs. 
  
2 
Bernard S. Black, Nicholas D. Chabraja Profes-
sor, Northwestern University Law School and Kel-
logg School of Management  
John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of 
Law and Director of the Center on Corporate Govern-
ance, Columbia Law School 
James D. Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, 
Duke University School of Law 
Ronald J. Gilson, Marc and Eva Stern Professor 
of Law and Business, Columbia Law School, and 
Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, 
Emeritus, Stanford Law School 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Richard Paul Richman Profes-
sor of Law and Co-Director, Richman Center for 
Business, Law & Public Policy, Columbia Law 
School 
Lawrence Hamermesh, Ruby R. Vale Professor of 
Corporate and Business Law, Widener University 
Delaware Law School 
Henry B. Hansmann, Oscar M. Ruebhausen Pro-
fessor of Law, Yale Law School 
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Professor of Law and Co-
Director, Ira M. Millstein Center, Columbia Law 
School  
Marcel Kahan, George T. Lowy Professor of Law, 
New York University School of Law 
Vikramaditya S. Khanna, William W. Cook Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Michigan Law School  
Michael Klausner, Nancy and Charles Munger 
Professor of Business and Professor of Law, Stanford 
Law School 
  
3 
Reinier H. Kraakman, Ezra Ripley Thayer Pro-
fessor of Law, Harvard Law School 
Donald C. Langevoort, Thomas Aquinas Reynolds 
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter 
Brian JM Quinn, Associate Dean for Experiential 
Learning and Associate Professor of Law, Boston Col-
lege Law School  
Edward B. Rock, Saul A. Fox Distinguished Pro-
fessor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School  
Mark J. Roe, David Berg Professor of Law, 
Harvard Law School 
Helen S. Scott, Professor of Law and Co-Director 
of the Leadership Program on Law and Business, 
New York University School of Law 
  
  
4 
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court has often looked to the rights of corpo-
rate shareholders in determining the rights of union 
members and non-members to control the union’s 
use of their funds for political spending, and vice 
versa.2  In doing so, the Court has sometimes as-
sumed that if shareholders disapprove of corporate 
political expression, they can easily sell their shares 
or exercise control over corporate spending.3  This 
assumption is mistaken.  Because of how capital is 
saved and invested in corporations, most individual 
shareholders cannot obtain full information about 
corporate speech or political activities, even after the 
fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being 
used to speak in ways with which they disagree.  
                                            
2 E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 
310, 343-44 (2010); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 
U.S. 93, 325 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring & dissenting), 
overruled in part by 558 U.S. 310; Austin v. Mich. State Cham-
ber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 709-10 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting), overruled by 558 U.S. 310; Fed. Election Comm’n v. 
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 247 (1986); First 
Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978); Pipefitters 
Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 401-02, 
406-08 (1972); United States v. Int’l Union UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 
567, 585 (1957). 
3 E.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370; McConnell, 540 
U.S. at 275 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring); Austin, 494 U.S. at 
709-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 555 (1980) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34; see 
also Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 678 F.2d 1092, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
  
5 
Union non-members are currently protected from 
being forced to fund union political expression or ac-
tivity by opt-out rights under Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and in this case plaintiffs 
seek the more expansive right to refuse to fund any 
union expression whatsoever.  In contrast, individual 
shareholders currently have no “opt out” rights or 
practical ability to avoid subsidizing corporate politi-
cal expression with which they disagree.  Nor do in-
dividuals have the practical option to refrain from 
putting any of their savings into equity investments, 
as doing so would impose damaging economic penal-
ties and ignore conventional financial guidance for 
individual investors.  If the Court decides to give un-
ion non-members additional rights to refuse to con-
tribute to union speech, the Court should not act on 
the erroneous belief that this will accord union non-
members the same rights enjoyed by individual in-
vestors.  Giving union non-members additional 
rights will only further increase the extent to which 
they enjoy greater rights than corporate sharehold-
ers. 
Part I shows that corporate law does not afford 
shareholders any right to “opt out” or otherwise con-
trol the use of capital they have invested in a corpo-
ration.  Part II shows that most corporate share-
holders have no ability to use voting rights or sell 
their shares to prevent their invested capital from 
being used in ways with which they disagree.  Part 
III describes how investment structures, tax policy, 
and conventional financial advice all drive individu-
als to invest in ways that reinforce their inability to 
obtain information about or control corporate politi-
cal spending. 
  
6 
ARGUMENT  
I. MOST INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS 
HAVE NO RIGHT TO “OPT OUT” OR 
OTHERWISE CONTROL THE USE OF 
CAPITAL THEY INVEST IN A 
CORPORATION. 
What can a shareholder do if she disagrees with a 
corporate expenditure, whether on a particular busi-
ness strategy or in support of a political position?  
The short answer is very little.  Shareholders do not 
typically have any right to control or direct the use of 
capital they have invested in a corporation, whether 
publicly or privately owned.   
Authority over corporate funds resides in a board 
of directors and officers to whom the board delegates 
authority.4  Shareholders of U.S. corporations have 
no authority to instruct or control boards, officers, 
employees, or corporate agents in how they act for a 
corporation, or to directly manage or act for a corpo-
ration.5  Instead, a “stockholder owns an interest in 
a share of stock, a financial investment granting no 
                                            
4  ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 105 (Little, 
Brown & Co., 1986) (“directors . . . have the formal legal power 
to manage the corporation”); Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 141(a) 
(West 2015).  Delaware has been the leading corporate jurisdic-
tion for decades, and this section is based primarily on Dela-
ware law, but fairly summarizes the law in other states as well.   
5 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 
232 (Del. 2008) (“it is well-established that stockholders of a 
corporation . . . may not directly manage the business and af-
fairs of the corporation”).  In Europe, shareholders do have 
rights to instruct directors.  REINIER KRAAKMAN, ET AL., THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 73 (Oxford 2d ed. 2009).  
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direct control over the properties, equipment, con-
tract rights, organizational structure, and other ele-
ments that make up the corporation itself.”6   
Indeed, a core goal of corporate law is to give di-
rectors and officers legal authority to act in ways 
with which shareholders may profoundly disagree.  
Directors, officers, employees and corporate agents 
are not agents of shareholders, and owe shareholders 
no duty of obedience.7  This “separation of ownership 
and control” is often identified as a fundamental or 
essential attribute of the corporate form.8  “A review 
of elementary corporate law shows that [the] power 
of [a] principal to direct the activities of [an] agent 
does not apply to the stockholders against the direc-
tors or officers of their corporation.”9  
Directors and officers are fiduciaries for the cor-
poration as a whole, and face judicial scrutiny in 
shareholder-initiated lawsuits over whether they 
                                            
6 Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of 
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 193 (1991).  For recent cases illustrating 
this point, see, e.g., Gorman v. Salamone, 2015 WL 4719681, *5 
(Del. Ch. July 31, 2015); CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237. 
7 Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 55-
57 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., Harvard 
Business School Press 1985). 
8  E.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 8-9 (Foundation Press, 2002); WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET 
AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS OR-
GANIZATION 79 (Aspen Publishers, 4th ed. 2012). 
9 Clark, supra note 7, at 56. 
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have acted with care or engaged in self-dealing.10  
However, their duties do not compel directors to use 
corporate funds to speak, or avoid speaking, in polit-
ical controversies as they believe shareholders would 
prefer, because the most basic of corporate law doc-
trines—the “business judgment rule”—precludes ju-
dicial review of board decisions, absent evidence of a 
conflict of interest or a complete failure to exercise 
any care.11   
Expenditures by corporations on politics do not 
typically generate heightened scrutiny, and share-
holders cannot use derivative lawsuits to override 
                                            
10 F.D.I.C. v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124, 130 (5th Cir. 1992).   
11 Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 54 A.D.2d 654 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1976), aff’g 338 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).  The fact 
that corporate speech furthers a director’s political views or 
goals would not typically give rise to a “conflict of interest” for 
corporate law purposes.  Heightened judicial scrutiny generally 
requires a showing of financial “self-dealing” where a fiduciary 
“stands on both sides” of a transfer of assets to or from the cor-
poration.  Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 21-23 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(“in the absence of self-dealing, it is not enough to establish the 
interest of a director by alleging that he received any benefit 
not equally shared by the stockholders”); Sullivan v. Hammer, 
1990 WL 114223, *5-*6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1990), aff’d 594 A.2d 
48 (Del. 1991) (corporate “gifts” merely required to be “within 
the range of reasonableness,” and board decision can be over-
turned on self-dealing grounds “only if a plaintiff can show that 
a majority of the directors expected to derive personal financial 
benefit from the transaction”); see also Theodora Holding Corp. 
v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969); Sinclair Oil 
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971); Case v. N.Y. 
Cent. R.R. Co., 204 N.E.2d 643, 646-47 (N.Y. 1965); Shlensky v. 
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
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decisions about such expenditures by boards. 12  
These facts about corporate law hold true even if (in 
an unrealistic hypothetical) shareholders were uni-
form in their political views, and uniformly opposed 
an expenditure approved by the corporate board.  
These facts are unquestionably true in a more typi-
cal situation where shareholders disagree among 
themselves about politics.  Nor do shareholders have 
indirect means to accomplish this goal—such as sell-
ing shares or using votes—as explained next. 
                                            
12 Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ 
Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 257-58 
(1981).  The application of the deferential business judgment 
rule to political expenditures is so clear that few cases have 
even been pursued to a reported decision.  A rare example, in 
which the court held the business judgment rule was a valid 
defense to an attack on a corporate contribution to a political 
action committee, is Finley v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
128 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  An exception that proves the rule is 
when political activity violates a statute, such as the statutory 
ban on corporate donations to a political party.  A legal viola-
tion removes judicial deference under the business judgment 
rule.  Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 
1974); cf. Barnes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 87, 92-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (claim by policyholder of 
mutual insurance company seeking to stop insurer from engag-
ing in political activities dismissed because decision was pro-
tected by business judgment rule and policyholder had no con-
stitutional right to prevent insurer’s use of premium revenues 
to support activities with which premium holder disagreed, nor 
to compel dividend to policyholders). 
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II. MOST INDIVIDUAL SHAREHOLDERS 
CANNOT INDIRECTLY INFLUENCE 
THE USE OF THEIR INVESTED CAPI-
TAL FOR POLITICAL EXPRESSION. 
The basic corporate law set out in Part I is some-
times viewed as incomplete because, it is asserted, 
shareholders have indirect methods of achieving 
what corporate law bars from them from achieving 
through direct control.  Shareholders, it is asserted 
or assumed, can “opt out” by withdrawing their 
funds if they do not approve of how directors are us-
ing their invested capital.13  Alternatively, they can 
use their power to vote to elect directors who will act 
as shareholders want.14   
These assumptions are wrong for most share-
holders.  Controlling shareholders15 may be able to 
control directors, but most shareholders beneficially 
own stock as minority investors in corporations with 
dispersed ownership.  Most investors have little in-
fluence, direct or indirect, on a typical corporate 
board.  As stated by the Chief Justice of the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, “the practical realities of stock 
market ownership have changed in ways that de-
prive most stockholders of both their right to voice 
                                            
13 E.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794 n.34 (1978) (a “shareholder 
invests in a corporation of his own volition and is free to with-
draw his investment at any time and for any reason.”). 
14 E.g., id. at 794–95 (emphasizing shareholders’ “power to 
elect the board of directors” as a way “to protect their own in-
terests.”). 
15 “Controlling shareholder” means a shareholder with suf-
ficient shares to determine the outcome of director elections.   
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and their right of exit.”16  Both the right to sell and 
the right to vote are typically useless for sharehold-
ers as a means of controlling or influencing specific 
corporate actions, including the use of corporate 
funds for political purposes. 
A. Shareholders do not typically have 
the right to compel a corporation 
to repurchase or find a buyer for 
their shares. 
Shareholders may not withdraw any of the funds 
they have invested in a corporation except insofar as 
a majority of the board approves a dividend or stock 
repurchase.17  Shareholders who wish to sell shares 
can only do so by finding third party buyers on their 
own.  But finding a buyer is typically difficult if not 
impossible at the majority of corporations, as dis-
cussed next.   
  
                                            
16 Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Colli-
sion Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law 
Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 370 
(2015). 
17 See Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 151(b) (West 2015) (every 
Delaware corporation must have at least one class of non-
redeemable common stock); Blaustein v. Lord Baltmore Capital 
Corp., 84 A.3d 954, 958-59 (Del. 2014); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 
A.2d 1366, 1379-80 (Del. 1993). 
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B. Shares of most corporations are 
not traded on public markets, and 
finding buyers for such shares is 
difficult or impossible.  
As of 2012, more than five million corporations 
filed U.S. income tax returns.18  Only about 4,000 
corporations were listed on a U.S. stock exchange—
less than 0.1% of corporations that filed tax re-
turns.19  Of the rest, some are owned by a single 
shareholder, but many are beneficially owned by 
dispersed minority owners.  Most publicly traded 
companies are bigger, on average, than companies 
that lack active public markets for their shares.  But 
many companies without public markets are still 
large and have substantial numbers of shareholders.  
Examples include Cargill, with revenues exceeding 
$130 billion and over 200 shareholders, and Mars, 
with revenues exceeding $33 billion and over 45 
                                            
18 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2012 STATISTICS OF INCOME, 
CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12coccr.pdf (Figure A). 
19 Listed Domestic Companies, Total, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2015).  More corporations are registered with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), OFFICE OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
STUDY OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 SECTION 404 INTERNAL 
CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 21 (Sept. 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/sox-
404_study.pdf, but many do so because they have publicly trad-
ed bonds and few shareholders, or lack significant amounts of 
trading volume.  John C. Coates IV, The Powerful and Perva-
sive Effects of Ownership on M&A (June 2010), at 5, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884157 (Table 1). 
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shareholders.20  Large non-listed companies also in-
clude those controlled by private equity funds, which 
represent dispersed investors through a variety of 
intermediaries.21  In total, the value of unlisted cor-
porations represents one-third to one-half of the val-
ue of all U.S. corporations.22   
Listed shares trade in significant volume—
thousands of shares per day.  By contrast, shares of 
the vast majority of corporations do not trade in pub-
                                            
20  Andrea Murphy, America’s Largest Private Companies 
2014, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://www.forbes.
com/sites/andreamurphy/2014/11/05/americas-largest-private-
companies-2014/.  See Petro Lisowsky & Michael Minnis, Which 
Private Firms Follow GAAP and Why? (Sept. 11, 2015), at 39, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373498 (Table 2) (about 
17,000 private firms report having more than 100 sharehold-
ers); Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and 
Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, 45 J. 
ACCOUNT. ECON. 181, 181 (2008) (hundreds of corporations 
cease to be SEC-registered but continue to have numerous 
shareholders). 
21  Private equity funds own about 10% of all corporate eq-
uity, controlling more than 12,000 U.S. companies.  Coates, su-
pra note 19, at 7 (Table 2); PE by the Numbers, Quick Facts, 
PRIVATE EQUITY GROWTH CAPITAL COUNCIL, http://www.pegcc.
org/education/pe-by-the-numbers/ (last updated Aug. 2015).   
22 John C. Coates IV, Thirty Years of Evolution in the Roles 
of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 79, 89 (Jennifer G. 
Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., Edward Elgar 2015) (Table 4.1).  
SEC rules require registration by companies with more than 
500 unaccredited record shareholders (or more than 2000 ac-
credited investors) and $10 million or more in assets.  15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 78l, 78m, 78o(d) (West 2015).  Public company 
shareholders are also unable to use sales or votes to influence 
political spending, for reasons discussed below. 
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lic markets at all.  When they do trade, they do so 
only erratically.23  Finding a buyer for shares that 
are not traded on public markets is difficult, and 
sometimes impossible, at least at any reasonable 
price.   
Shares of unlisted corporations trade at heavily 
discounted prices relative to their intrinsic value be-
cause of their lack of liquidity.24  One study found 
that, controlling for observable differences unrelated 
to liquidity, stocks increased in price by 25% when 
first listed on the New York Stock Exchange.25  Simi-
larly, a study showed that prices for companies 
without publicly traded stock can be 30% lower than 
for comparable publicly held companies.26  A minori-
ty equity position does not have ability to control the 
                                            
23 Leuz et al., supra note 20, at 184, 204-05 (reporting on 
private companies with stocks that are traded but only at low 
levels, with trading not occurring on many days).  Private equi-
ty funds do not trade stocks, except as part of a sale of an entire 
corporation, as chosen by fund advisors, not fund investors. 
24 Reasons for this include:  Few buyers have information 
about such companies or sellers.  Few sellers have information 
about potential buyers, or even who they may be.  Few dealers 
hold such shares in inventory, and few brokers are available to 
look for buyers.  Few if any research analysts cover such com-
panies.  Transaction costs will be significant relative to the 
sale.  Such shares are held longer, tax bases are lower, and 
sales trigger higher taxes.  Fraud risk is higher, as such com-
panies are not subject to disclosure laws or SEC enforcement. 
25 Gary C. Sanger & John J. McConnell, Stock Exchange 
Listings, Firm Value, and Security Market Efficiency: The Im-
pact of NASDAQ, 21 J. FIN. QUANT. ANAL. 1, 14, 16 (1986). 
26 John Koeplin et al., The Private Company Discount, 12 J. 
APPL. CORP. FIN. 94, 95 (2000). 
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decisions of the company, resulting in a further de-
crease in value known as a “minority discount.”27  
Even if shareholders are willing to accept such dis-
counts, sales of stock of private companies take sig-
nificant time and trigger taxes, reducing the attrac-
tiveness of “exit” in response to corporate actions the 
shareholder disfavors.  
In sum, the majority of individual owners of 
shares of the majority of corporations would incur 
significant economic costs to sell their shares.   
C. Stock sales cannot generally be 
used to prevent, deter, or influence 
the political activities of publicly 
traded companies.  
Even for shareholders of publicly listed compa-
nies, the ability to sell is generally not an effective 
remedy for undesirable corporate political expendi-
tures.  Disclosure laws are currently such that 
shareholders do not receive information that would 
enable sales in advance of, or even in response to, 
political expenditures.  From the perspective of the 
shareholder, a sale in response to an unwanted polit-
ical expenditure would come too late, would be at a 
price where the expenditure was already “priced in,” 
and would entail relatively large costs (including 
taxes).  As such, individual share sales would at best 
be the equivalent of closing the barn door after a 
horse has been stolen, the stock being sold at a price 
that already reflects the conduct to which the share-
                                            
27 John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of 
Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 
147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1262-63 (1999).  
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holder objected.  
Federal law does not require corporations to pro-
vide shareholders with advance notice of political 
expenditures.28  In fact, most public companies do 
not disclose anything about political expenditures, 
even after the fact, except for contributions to con-
nected political action committees that are required 
to be disclosed under lobbying disclosure laws.  Ef-
forts to petition the SEC to adopt disclosure re-
quirements for public companies29 have to date been 
unavailing, and lobbying regulations are underen-
forced and far from comprehensive.30  While an in-
creasing number of the very largest companies have 
voluntarily adopted disclosure policies, few make 
comprehensive disclosures—they do not, for exam-
ple, report their contributions to trade groups that 
lobby on their behalf.31  Almost none makes these 
                                            
28 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate 
Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 89 (2010). 
29 See COMMITTEE ON DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE POLITICAL 
SPENDING, PETITION FOR RULEMAKING (Aug. 3, 2011), available 
at http://sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf.   
30  Charles Fried et al., Lobbying Law in the Spotlight:  
Challenges and Proposed Improvements, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 
434-36, 462-63 (2011).  
31 See ZICKLIN CENTER FOR BUSINESS ETHICS RESEARCH AT 
THE WHARTON SCHOOL OF THE UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA, THE 
2015 CPA-ZICKLIN INDEX OF CORPORATE POLITICAL DISCLOSURE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 14-15 (Center for Political Accountability 
2015), available at http://tinyurl.com/out9bfj.  Shareholders can 
seek information about political spending based on their rights 
to inspect corporate “books and records,” e.g., Del. Code Ann. 
Title 8, § 220, but to be effective such requests typically require 
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disclosures in advance.32 
A prominent set of undisclosed corporate expend-
itures are dues and other contributions to trade 
groups or organizations organized under Internal 
Revenue Code sections 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(6). 33  
Those organizations can spend up to half of their 
revenues on politics without being treated as “politi-
cal” by the Internal Revenue Service and without 
disclosing specific donors, and they may be able to 
spend more, to the extent tax law is underenforced.  
Occasional leaks or accidental disclosures reveal 
that many public corporations give substantial sums 
to these organizations. 34   Outside such accidental 
disclosures, shareholders ordinarily never learn 
about these expenditures even after the fact, much 
less in advance.   
Shareholders thus have no means to respond to 
corporate political spending to which they object.  
Shareholders often never find out their money is be-
ing used to fund political expression or activity to 
                                                                                         
threatened or actual litigation and resources beyond those 
available to most shareholders. 
32 ZICKLIN, supra note 31, at 14-15.   
33 For data on spending by such organizations, see Bebchuk 
& Jackson, supra note 28, at 94. 
34 E.g., Jonathan Weisman, G.O.P. Error Reveals Donors 
and the Price of Access, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2014, at A15, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/us/republicans
-corporate-donors-governors.html?_r=0 (article detailing inad-
vertent disclosures of members of 501(c)(4), including Coca-
Cola, Exxon Mobil, Pfizer, and Walmart, each of which contrib-
uted at least $250,000). 
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which they would object, and even when they do find 
out, any sale of shares will be too late to allow them 
to “opt out” of that spending.  By the time the sale 
occurs, the political speech has already have been 
made in the name of the corporation with the share-
holders’ money.  Without comprehensive disclosure, 
even the deterrent effect of after-the-fact sales has 
little force.  
In addition, given that “market professionals 
generally consider most publicly announced material 
statements about companies, thereby affecting stock 
market prices,”35 any expenditure will have already 
had whatever effect on share value it is likely to 
have by the time a shareholder learns about it, and 
any sale by the shareholder will be at a price reflect-
ing that effect.  Sales of shares would also generate 
transaction costs and trigger taxes.  As a result, they 
would only occur if a shareholder were willing to in-
cur material economic losses to protest the use of the 
shareholder’s invested capital. 
From the perspective of a corporate board, if 
shareholders sold shares en masse to protest the 
same political expenditure, and buyers of the stock 
shared the same negative view of the expenditure, 
the company’s stock price could fall, increasing its 
cost of capital.  However, shareholders have no way 
to coordinate among themselves in choosing whether 
or when to sell.  They are also unlikely to respond 
uniformly or rapidly to the limited information 
                                            
35 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 
2398, 2403 (2014) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
248, n.28 (1988)). 
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available about political expenditures, in part be-
cause they (and potential buyers of the stock) disa-
gree about politics and the importance of any given 
expenditure. 
Even if shareholders could overcome their collec-
tive action problem, even if they had uniform views 
about politics, and even if potential buyers of their 
stock shared their views, companies raise relatively 
little capital from equity investors after their initial 
public offerings.36  They instead rely on earnings and 
external debt to fund growth. 37   The prospect of 
slightly higher equity capital costs due to sales by 
shareholders would not deter most corporations from 
political activity. 
In sum, shareholders cannot control or deter po-
litical expenditures by selling their stock, or threat-
ening to do so, even at public companies.  This is 
true even though many individual shareholders may 
in fact disapprove of corporate political speech.  The 
majority of the beneficial owners of public companies 
have no practical way to withdraw their capital to 
prevent or control corporate political expenditures.  
D. Shareholder voting rights are not 
generally useful for directing or 
influencing specific corporate 
actions. 
The right to vote is no more useful than the right 
to sell for shareholders who wish to control corporate 
                                            
36 JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 
524-25 (Pearson, 3d ed. 2014). 
37 Id. 
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political expenditures.  The reason is simple:  Most 
shareholders—and the majority of individual share-
holders in public corporations—are not controlling 
shareholders.38  That is, they do not have sufficient 
voting rights to control their companies, nor do they 
have the capacity to acquire control of the companies 
in which they invest.  Their voting rights give them 
                                            
38 See note 15 above.  A listed company will have in excess 
of 500 shareholders on the company’s stock ledger (“record” 
shareholders), and in fact public companies have on average 
more than 12,000 record shareholders.  Coates, supra note 19, 
at 5 (Table 1).  Some companies, such as Procter & Gamble, 
have more than 2,000,000 shareholders.  Id. at 5. By definition, 
only one shareholder can be a “majority shareholder” for any 
company.  Even if several shareholders together control the 
company, the number of shareholders in the control group will 
usually be no more than a few.   
An average public company thus has 12,000 minority 
shareholders and only one majority shareholder or a few con-
trol shareholders.  Even this understates the ratio of minority 
to control shareholders, because (as discussed in Part III) 
two-thirds of record shareholders are institutions, which invest 
on behalf of thousands (or in aggregate, millions) of others.  
Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, The Changing Nature of 
Institutional Stock Investing (Nov. 12, 2014 working paper), at 
2-3, available at http://tinyurl.com/qhqskrp; Coates, supra note 
22, at 81.  More than 95 million individuals own shares 
through 3200 U.S. domestic equity mutual funds, for example.  
Kimberly Burham et al., Ownership of Mutual Funds, Share-
holder Sentiment, and Use of the Internet, 2013, ICI RES. 
PERSP., Oct. 2013, at 1, available at https://www.ici.org/pdf/
per19-09.pdf; BRIAN REID ET AL., 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY 
FACT BOOK 177 (Investment Company Institute, 5th ed. 2015) 
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf (Table 5).  
Thus, the true ratio of minority to control shareholders is vast-
ly higher than 12,000 to 2 or 3 that the record shareholder data 
suggest.   
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no practical ability to influence management gener-
ally, much less to control or opt out of specific politi-
cal expenditures.   
The majority of corporations with dispersed own-
ership have one of two types of ownership structures, 
neither of which creates practical opportunities for 
voting rights to influence board decisions.  At many 
corporations, one person or small group has a control 
“block” with effective ability to control the election of 
directors, which renders the nominal voting rights of 
minority investors incapable of changing the compo-
sition of the board.39  Examples include Walmart, 
Ford, Google, and Facebook.  A recent study found 
that 96% of a representative sample of U.S. compa-
nies listed on a stock exchange have a voting block 
with 40% of the stock on average, and in many the 
block controls a majority of shares.40  Since directors 
are elected based on a plurality or majority of shares 
voted, an effort by a minority shareholder seeking to 
displace a director at these companies is either whol-
ly futile (where a majority block will determine the 
outcome), or would require convincing more than 
95% of non-affiliated shareholders, a burden that is 
insurmountable in practice.   
In the second category, most public companies 
that lack majority or near-majority blockholders are 
large and have such dispersed ownership that few if 
any shareholders are capable of overcoming the costs 
of coordinating other shareholders to mount an effec-
                                            
39 Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in 
the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1378-80 (2009). 
40 Id. at 1382. 
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tive election contest.41  To elect directors at public 
companies, shareholders must solicit “proxies,” 
which requires significant legal and communication 
costs.  Incumbent directors, by contrast, can rely on 
corporate funds to pay their costs of fighting the con-
test.  A proxy contest typically lasts months42 and is 
“extraordinarily expensive” for shareholders,43 who 
commonly incur more than ten million dollars in ex-
penses 44  and are still outspent by incumbents. 45  
Even when pursued by well-resourced activist hedge 
funds, proxy contests are often unsuccessful.46  To 
give their proxy fights a boost, hedge funds build 
blocks of stock that are substantially larger than 
most individuals own or could afford—yet even 
hedge funds generally avoid full-blown proxy con-
tests.47   While activist hedge funds have been in-
                                            
41 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 29, 62. 
42 Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: 
Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 
610, 621 (2013) (Table 4). 
43  Jana Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 
A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 2008) (citing RANDALL S. THOMAS & 
CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EISHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS 
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 21.01 (3d ed. 2001 supp.)). 
44Gantchev, supra note 42, at 610. 
45 Mark A. Stach, An Overview of Legal and Tactical Con-
siderations in Proxy Contests: The Primary Means of Effecting 
Fundamental Corporate Change in the 1990s, 13 Geo. Mason U. 
L. Rev. 745, 776 (1991).   
46 Gantchev, supra note 42, at 620. 
47 Id. at 618 (Gantchev assembles a comprehensive data set 
of proxy contests between 2000 and 2007 and identifies only 74 
that qualify—less than 0.1% of all elections of corporate direc-
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creasing in influence and activity levels over time, 
their resources well exceed those of most individuals.  
Institutions that invest on behalf of most individu-
als—such as mutual funds and pension funds—
rarely wage proxy contests.   
In sum, whether because of insider blocks, or be-
cause of the collective action costs of proxy contests, 
most shareholders of U.S. public companies do not 
have meaningful ability to use their votes to influ-
ence boards of directors about anything, much less 
specific political expenditures.  
III. MANY INDIVIDUALS ARE 
EFFECTIVELY COMPELLED TO 
MAINTAIN INVESTMENTS IN 
COMPANIES WHOSE POLITICAL 
EXPENDITURES THEY DO NOT KNOW 
AND CANNOT CONTROL. 
The bottom line of Part II is that the majority of 
individual shareholders cannot use their rights to 
sell or vote to avoid subsidizing corporate political 
speech or activity with which they disagree.  Rein-
forcing these limits are three trends in the owner-
ship of U.S. corporations over the last thirty years.  
These trends are towards (1) more institutional own-
ership, (2) more “layers” of institutions between in-
dividual owners and corporations, and (3) a general 
                                                                                         
tors over that period).  A more recent study finds a modest in-
crease in 2008 and 2009, but then a fall-off in 2010, and in all 
years proxy contests occur in only a tiny fraction of board elec-
tions.  Vyacheslav Fos & Margarita Tsoutsoura, Shareholder 
Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests, 114 
J. FIN. ECON. 316, 339 (2014) (Fig A1). 
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weakening of the ability of individuals to take ac-
tion—whether through sales, votes, lawsuits or oth-
erwise—to respond to corporate activities.   
A partial cause of these trends is the now-
standard financial advice for individuals to invest in 
diversified, low-cost, broad-based baskets of stocks 
and to “buy and hold” for the long term.  Standard 
employer-sponsored retirement savings plans—a 
channel through which an increasing share of in-
vestment flows—make it difficult or impossible for 
individuals to do otherwise.  Institutional intermedi-
aries are not generally required to pass along to in-
dividual investors information they may receive as 
record (i.e., formal) shareholders about specific deci-
sions by corporations they own.  Together, these 
forces effectively cause an increasing number of in-
dividuals to maintain investments in corporations, 
even if the individuals disagree with political speech 
by corporations using their investment capital.   
A. Most beneficial owners of public 
corporations are individuals who 
own through institutions such as 
mutual funds and pension funds. 
Since the mid-20th century, institutions—pension 
funds, insurance companies, bank trusts, mutual 
funds, and other intermediaries—have held increas-
ing amounts of stock issued by American corpora-
tions.  Figure 1 reflects the Federal Reserve’s “Flow 
of Funds” data, a standard source of information 
about this trend.48  The Fed’s data make clear the 
                                            
48 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, 
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general magnitude and persistence of the trend to-
ward institutional ownership. 
Figure 1:  Institutional Ownership  
of U.S. Corporate Equity   
 
The increase in institutional ownership began as 
early as the 1950s, and has continued steadily ever 
since.  While ownership by the types of “institutions” 
tracked by the Fed leveled off after 2000, other insti-
tutions, such as hedge funds and private equity 
funds, have continued to increase their ownership.  
The result is that less than one-third of total equity 
                                                                                         
BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS 
118 (2015), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
z1/current/z1.pdf (Table L.213).  These data are not compre-
hensive, and understate institutional ownership because they 
count private equity funds, non-profits, and hedge funds in the 
“household” sector.  Coates, supra note 22, at 89. 
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in U.S. companies is now held directly by individu-
als.  
The number of institutional layers between any 
given corporation and the individuals who indirectly 
own its stock (the “beneficial owners”) has also 
grown.  Institutions own about 10% of stock held by 
equity mutual funds, and a larger share of other mu-
tual funds—an increasing trend of individuals own-
ing shares of institutions, which in turn invest in 
other institutions, which in turn own corporate 
stock.49   
Mutual funds are a good example.  Corporate law 
only allows formal “record” owners that have held 
shares continuously or on a certain date to exercise 
shareholder rights.50  Mutual fund shares are com-
monly owned in “omnibus accounts” in which a bro-
ker pools shares on behalf of multiple clients in “sub-
accounts,” commonly including pension funds or in-
surers, some of which invest on behalf of multiple 
beneficiaries. 51   This pooling and commingling 
                                            
49 REID ET AL., supra note 38, at 217 (funds of funds), 234 
(institutional investors other than funds of funds) (Tables 45, 
62). 
50 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206, *3 (Del. 
Ch. July 13, 2015) (granting motion for summary judgment, 
holding institutional investors did not have appraisal rights 
because administrative transfers among the layers of owner-
ship violated what the court acknowledged was technical and 
antiquated system focusing on continuous formal record owner-
ship). 
51 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS, 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, NATIONAL EXAM RISK 
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means that individuals who invest their savings in 
mutual funds—or who were forced to put their 
workplace retirement savings into mutual funds—
are not the formal owners of “record” of any of the 
companies their savings are supporting.  
B. Individuals who own stock through 
intermediaries do not have the 
right to direct the sale or votes of 
their shares. 
Most corporate stock held by institutions are held 
by separate legal entities, such as mutual funds, 
pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, 
and private equity funds.  Such entities do not pass 
through to their own beneficial owners either the 
rights to vote or sell the shares of the stock they pur-
chase.  Pension fund beneficiaries, for example, have 
no ability to influence the companies in which the 
funds are invested.52   Insureds have no ability to 
control how insurance companies invest the premi-
ums they pay.  Investors in mutual funds or ex-
change-traded funds do have the ability to select 
funds based on stated investment policies, just as 
annuitants generally have the ability to set basic in-
vestment parameters for how their funds are invest-
ed; once their funds are invested, however, the annu-
itants and fund investors have no ability to force the 
divestment of a particular corporate stock, and may 
only divest from the fund as a whole.  Even the pro-
                                                                                         
ALERT 1, 4 (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/ocie/riskalert-mastersubaccounts.pdf. 
52 Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 
167 (1998). 
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fessional managers of the increasingly important 
category of index funds cannot sell a given compa-
ny’s stock, because they have precommitted to hold 
an entire index. 
Individuals who own any of these types of institu-
tional investments cannot exercise voting rights as-
sociated with the shares.  Instead, those rights are 
exercised by the management of the institutions.  
Individuals that invest through institutions face col-
lective action problems that are just as large as (if 
not larger than) those facing individuals who directly 
invest in corporations.  The result is that most indi-
viduals, who now primarily invest through separate 
entity intermediaries, cannot even exercise the lim-
ited powers analyzed in Part II.   
To make these points concrete, consider an indi-
vidual who buys the stock of a large broad-based 
stock fund, such as Vanguard’s S&P 500 index fund.  
That individual’s savings are invested in the stocks 
of companies listed on the S&P index.  Currently, 
that fund owns shares of Apple, Inc.  If, hypothetical-
ly, Apple’s board or its government affairs officer 
were to spend money on political speech disfavored 
by the individual, the individual has no power to 
compel Vanguard to sell Apple stock in response.  
Nor can the individual compel Vanguard to vote 
against Apple’s current directors.  All the individual 
can do is to sell the Vanguard fund shares.  But if 
the individual wants to invest in a broad-based 
large-cap fund of any kind, which would be advisable 
for reasons discussed next, that individual would on-
ly be selling Vanguard shares to buy another fund’s 
shares, which in turn would be likely to own Apple 
stock.  In short, unless an individual decides to ig-
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nore standard financial advice about how to invest, 
there is no way to avoid an investment in Apple, 
however disagreeable its political activities may be.  
C. Individual investors have little 
prudent choice other than 
investing through institutions to 
achieve diversification.   
Part of the reason for the growth in institutional 
investors is that finance theory and conventional fi-
nancial advice long ago identified the fact that most 
individuals are not well situated to select specific 
stocks from thousands of equity investments. 53  
Standard financial theory also has long identified 
diversification as an important tool for investors to 
achieve the best risk-adjusted returns.54   
Diversification entails identifying and maintain-
ing a substantial number of investments, not just 
one or a few, and monitoring the companies selected 
over time.  For example, when two companies merge, 
when one company goes bankrupt, or when a com-
pany divests a major business, investors must “re-
balance” their portfolios to maintain a desired degree 
of diversification and risk.  Dividends must be rein-
vested, brokers retained, tax records kept, and fil-
ings made.  Maintaining a diversified portfolio re-
                                            
53 For an empirical study documenting the disadvantages 
individual direct investors face, see Brad M. Barber & Terrance 
Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common 
Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. 
FIN. 773 (2000). 
54 Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 79 
(1952). 
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quires effort, expertise, and time. 
Professional asset management has also increas-
ingly been most cost-effective for individual investors 
through passive, indexed investment strategies. 55  
Such strategies involve buying and holding broad-
based index funds or financial products that mimic 
such funds, which can achieve hard-to-beat returns 
at low cost over sustained periods of time.  Most 
nominally “active” mutual funds rely to a large ex-
tent on passive investment in baskets of stock, and 
simply “overweight” or “underweight” portions of the 
relevant market benchmark.56  Pension funds, too, 
outsource portfolio management to advisers that in-
vest in large numbers of public companies, rather 
than a select few.   
A further force leading individuals to invest 
through institutions is the growing use of defined 
contribution (DC) retirement plans such as 401(k) 
and 403(b) plans.57  Investment through DC plans 
                                            
55 Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mu-
tual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J. FIN. 549, 571 (1995); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 596 (Aspen Publishers, 
8th ed. 2011). 
56 K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is 
Your Fund Manager? A New Measure That Predicts Perfor-
mance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329, 3330 (2009). 
57 “Defined contribution” plans do not promise specific bene-
fits, but instead allocate specific amounts as elected by an em-
ployee from their wages (sometimes matched by the employer) 
into an investment account to be held for the employee’s bene-
fit, typically until retirement.  In contrast, more conventional 
pension plans are called “defined benefit” plans because they 
promise beneficiaries a specific set of benefits in retirement, 
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enjoys strong tax benefits58—or, equivalently, inves-
tors pay economic penalties to invest outside a plan.  
As a result, “[v]irtually all saving by the working-age 
population currently takes place within employer-
sponsored pension plans.” 59   An annual survey of 
employer-sponsored plans found that 78% of eligible 
employees participate, and fully diversified plan op-
tions are the default and most common investment 
choice.60  Less than 10% of DC plans gave employees 
the option to directly manage their investments in 
individual stocks, and even those impose additional 
fees on investors.61   
While employees are given choices within DC 
plans, these plans are designed by employers with 
little input from typical employees.  Most plans im-
pose significant limits on the flexibility of employee-
investors to choose from the universe of potential in-
                                                                                         
and the risk of investment shortfalls is borne by the plan spon-
sor.   
58 Retirement Savings Contributions Credit (Saver’s Credit), 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-
Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Retirement-Savings-
Contributions-Savers-Credit (last updated Oct. 23, 2015) (“The 
amount of the [tax] credit is 50%, 20% or 10% of your retire-
ment plan or IRA contributions up to $2,000 ($4,000 if married 
filing jointly), depending on your adjusted gross income . . . .”). 
59 Alicia H. Munnell et al., What’s the Tax Advantage of 
401(k)s?, CENTER FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COL-
LEGE, Feb. 2012, at 6, available at http://tinyurl.com/ndjkdwh.   
60 AON HEWITT, 2014 UNIVERSE BENCHMARKS HIGHLIGHTS 1, 
4 (2014), available at http://tinyurl.com/n964gmq. 
61 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification, 124 
YALE L.J. 1476, 1485 & n.28, 1539 (2015).   
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vestments, and commonly direct investments into 
the kind of diversified index or other broad-based 
funds that standard finance theory and advice rec-
ommends for individuals.62  An individual might get 
to select between an international index fund and an 
S&P 500 fund, but would rarely get to select between 
investing in Apple and Walmart.  
“The most common type of investment options in 
401(k) plans are mutual funds or similar investment 
vehicles that pool funds managed by a professional 
fund manager.”63  Early withdrawals from these ac-
counts are tax penalized64 and discouraged by plan 
design.65  Similar tax subsidies and restrictions ap-
                                            
62  Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law 
Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens 
United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 539 (2010); see also Anne 
Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the De-
fined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 181-82 (2013); 
BRIGHTSCOPE & INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, THE 
BRIGHTSCOPE / ICI DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN PROFILE:  A 
CLOSE LOOK AT 401(K) PLANS 7, 15-17, 25 (2014), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_14_dcplan_profile_401k.pdf (docu-
menting number of investment options, portion in types of as-
set classes, growth in indexed equity funds within DC plans, 
and that about 80% of plan assets are invested in diversified 
institutions). 
63  Ayres & Curtis, supra note 61, at 1485, citing Sarah 
Holden et al., 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, 
and Loan Activity in 2012, 19 ICI RES. PERSP. Dec. 2013 at 1, 
21.   
64 I.R.C. § 401(k) (West 2015). 
65 Phil Edwards et al., Defined Contribution Plan Success 
Factors, DCIIA, May 2015, at 4, available at http://tinyurl.com/
edwards-dciia.   
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ply to 529 plans, which have been increasingly used 
by individuals to save for college education for their 
children.66  To benefit from the tax subsidies fueling 
the growth in DC plans, individuals must give up the 
right to choose or influence the corporations in which 
they invest.   
As a result of these trends in financial manage-
ment, it is difficult for most individual investors to 
find any means of investing in corporate stock that 
does not rely on both institutional intermediaries 
and a broad-based, index or quasi-index strategy for 
investing.  The bottom line is that most individuals 
now invest in a large number of public companies, 
but do so indirectly, and generally cannot pick and 
choose stocks based on the recent or expected specific 
behavior of corporate issuers. 
D. Institutional intermediaries are 
not generally required to track or 
disclose to their beneficiaries the 
political activities of the companies 
in which they invest. 
Another effect of increased institutional owner-
ship of corporate stock, and of increased “layers” of 
institutions, is to decrease further the amount of in-
formation that a typical individual shareholder can 
obtain about the political activities of the companies 
                                            
66 See An Introduction to 529 Plans, SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
intro529.htm (last modified Jan. 6, 2014) (“participants in col-
lege savings plans have limited investment options and are not 
permitted to switch freely among available investment op-
tions.”). 
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in which the individual invests.  As discussed above, 
most corporations do not provide detailed infor-
mation about political expenditures.  What limited 
information they do provide to shareholders is given 
to shareholders of record, which are increasingly in-
stitutional investors.   
Institutions, in turn, report the values of their 
investments, but they are not required to gather, 
analyze and pass on information about the activities 
of the companies in their portfolio.  Institutions such 
as mutual funds do not typically report to their in-
vestors even basic financial information about com-
panies in which they invest, such as earnings, much 
less operational information such as political ex-
penditures.  Nor do institutions typically devote any 
effort to monitor political activities of the companies 
in which they invest.  Thus, even if individuals 
wanted to pressure the companies they indirectly 
own to alter political expenditures, they would lack 
even the most basic rights to obtain information to 
know where to focus their pressure.   
E. Most individual investors are in 
practice compelled to maintain 
investments in companies that can 
engage in political expenditures 
with which the investors disagree. 
Together, the forces described in this Part III ef-
fectively compel an increasing number of individuals 
to maintain investments in large numbers of corpo-
rations, even if the individuals disagree with politi-
cal expressions or activities taken by those corpora-
tions.   
  
35 
Individuals of course can choose not to invest in 
stock at all, or choose not to invest in stock through 
retirement plans.  But avoiding all equity invest-
ment imposes a massive economic penalty over 
time.67  Using conventional figures for expected re-
turns on diversified equity investments and con-
trasting them with investments in Treasury bonds, 
Figure 2 depicts how large the economic penalty of 
staying out of stocks altogether grows over the 
course of a typical investor’s life.68 
The results are dramatic.  An investor in stocks 
can expect to have more than eight times as much 
money after 35 years as an investor making the 
same investment in government bonds.  If one were 
to assume that further investments were made each 
year, as is customary for ordinary savers, the gap 
would widen further.  There simply is no economic 
“option” for ordinary individuals saving for retire-
ment to choose to avoid stocks altogether.  
                                            
67 Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political 
Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 
838-40 (2012). 
68  The figure uses data from Aswath Damodaran, Data, 
DAMODARAN ONLINE, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/
New_Home_Page/data.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2015).  It as-
sumes a fixed one-time investment of $1000 by an investor at 
age 30, and compounds returns annually on a diversified port-
folio of equity investments using an expected rate of return 
composed of the Treasury bond rate of 2.22% and an implied 
equity risk premium of 6.28%, derived from trailing twelve-
month cash yield on investments in the S&P 500.  It compares 
the return on that investment with the return on investment 
on Treasury bonds over the same period.   
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Figure 2:  The Cost of Opting Out of Stock  
 
The same general point applies to the decision to 
opt out of the tax advantages of broadly diversified 
DC plans.  Figure 3 depicts how large the economic 
penalty of electing to invest directly in stocks and 
not through tax-advantaged DC plans can be. 69  
While not as severe as the cost of avoiding equity al-
together, the cost of trying to avoid the constraints of 
401(k) plans by investing directly in taxable ac-
counts is still a draconian penalty, roughly equal to a 
third of the expected return on a standard equity in-
                                            
69 This figure uses conventional figures for expected equity 
returns and averages after-tax returns for taxable and tax-
deferred accounts over the past twenty-five years, based on da-
ta and analysis from Munnell et al., supra note 59, at 5 (Table 
4).  It assumes a 6% expected pre-tax return, divided into 2% 
dividends and 4% capital gains.   
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vestment.  And this figure understates the penalty, 
because it excludes the “match” commonly given by 
employers for investments through DC plans, and 
only compares one investment at age 30, rather than 
a more realistic stream of investments over time. 
Figure 3:  The Cost of Opting Out of  
Tax-Advantaged 401(k) 
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CONCLUSION 
In sum, shareholders generally have no control 
over corporate political spending.  Under existing se-
curities law and SEC regulations, shareholders lack 
basic disclosure about corporate political expenses.  
Even if they wanted to act on the limited infor-
mation available, long-standing and basic corporate 
law prevents shareholders from overriding or influ-
encing board decisions about political spending.  Nor 
can shareholders use their rights to sell or vote to do 
indirectly what they cannot do directly.  Exit rights 
are absent in a majority of U.S. corporations, and 
would come too late to be effective as a response to 
spending that shareholders disfavor.   
Long-standing trends towards institutional, in-
dexed, and constrained ownership further limits the 
powers of individuals to control corporate political 
spending.  As Delaware’s Chief Justice noted, “most 
of the stock of the wealthiest corporations in our so-
ciety is not owned directly by human beings.”70  As a 
result of basic corporate law, financial reality, and 
tax policy, an increasingly large majority of Ameri-
cans are effectively forced “to turn over their wealth 
to institutions that are permitted to use it for ex-
pressive purposes that they do not support.”71   
Union non-members are currently protected from 
being forced to fund union political expression 
against their will by their opt-out rights, and in this 
case plaintiffs seek even broader rights to not fund 
                                            
70 Strine & Walter, supra note 16, at 340. 
71 Id. at 342. 
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any union speech or activity whatsoever.  The pur-
pose of this brief was to show that, in contrast to the 
protections afforded union non-members, individual 
shareholders have no “opt out” rights, much less the 
practical ability to choose not to subsidize corporate 
political expression with which they disagree.  If this 
Court chooses to grant additional First Amendment 
rights to union non-members, it will only further in-
crease the extent to which they enjoy greater rights 
than do corporate shareholders. 
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